Modification of a Contract in New York:
Criteria for Enforcementt

This comment compares and evaluates the criteria for determining the
validity of three classes of contract modifications in New York.
The initial discussion deals with informal modifications under consideration theory. Traditional consideration theory is said to allow
enforcement of a contract modification only if it is supported by an
additional consideration. In fact, the court of appeals never adopted
this rule for New York. It enforced a larger group of modifications by
requiring a direct showing of consent to the change; no one act was
selected by the court to represent the consent of the parties. Only
when the court believed that the requisite consent was lacking-for
example due to economic coercion'--would it state that the modification was unenforceable because it lacked additional consideration.
Thus, the court enforced gratuitously modified contracts, that is,
modifications where the promisor received nothing in exchange for
his new promise.
Further indication that the court of appeals believed consideration
theory was too limiting is illustrated by a discussion of formal modifications under seal. In 1937 and again in 1941, the court stated that
the demands of the business community required the enforcement of
all agreements that employed a formal enforcement device, the seal.
By eliminating the requirement of a bargained-for exchange for
original contracts, the gratuitous contract became enforceable. As a
result, the gratuitous contract could become the subject of a modification, and the realm of enforceable modifications was expanded to indude the modified gratuitous promise. However, the defense of nonconsent, i.e., economic coercion, fraud or mistake, was available to
negate the seal's inherent presumption of enforceability.
t Ronald M. DeKoven, B.A. 1965, Stanford University; third year law student, University of Chicago. The author expresses appreciation to Professor Grant Gilmore for
guidance and encouragement, hastening, however, to add that any flaws in the comment

are his own.
1 Economic coercion is a shorthand term to describe the defenses of undue influence
and duress of goods.
While consent is also eliminated by fraud or mistake, practical considerations limit this
comment to an analysis of the economic coercion cases in support of the conclusion that
the court of appeals created a consent rule for informal modifications.
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The legislative response to these two earlier enforcement devices
is embodied in section 33(2) of the Personal Property Laws, 2 which
created a third enforcement device for modifications; it required the
terms of the modification to be included in a signed writing. The Law
Revision Commissions recommended this after it found fault with the
earlier devices. The Commission believed that the consent rule created
unnecessary uncertainty for the enforcement of contract modifications;
the existence of consent, a prerequisite to enforcement, was always
a question for future determination. However, the Commission failed
to recognize that some questions must always be left to future determination, through an enforcement device or defenses to an enforcement device, if enforcement of nonconsensual agreements is to be
avoided. No formal enforcement device can, per se, communicate to
the court whether, in fact, an agreement was made voluntarily. The
Commission also believed that the court of appeals' revival of the seal
was unjustified, as it no longer effectively indicated that the parties
intended an enforceable agreement; the form of the seal had degenerated to a printed "L.S." In addition, the Commission did not believe
that the gratuitous contract or the modified gratuitous contract should
be enforced; it desired a return to consideration theory. The legislature, bowing to the Commission's desires, eliminated the seal as an
effective enforcement device.
Section 33(2) did not have its intended effect. The court of appeals
recognized that the defenses of nonconsent were necessary for the
statute to create a system that did not enforce involuntary modifications. In addition, the court continued to enforce informal modificaions under the consent rule. Certainty of contract did not achieve the
absolute significance that the Commission hoped for. Yet, the court
did not disagree with the Commission's aim of eliminating the enforcement of gratuitous agreements; perhaps they lacked the great
business significance the court once thought they held.
The final section of the comment deals with section 33-c of the Personal Property Laws, 4 which created a private statute of frauds that
gave contracting parties the power to prohibit all modifications not included in a signed writing. This was necessary since the protective rule
that formal contracts could be modified only in a writing was eliminated with the seal. Here, too, the Commission created a rule that
elevated certainty of contract over other considerations. The statute was
drafted without exceptions so that adopting parties could be certain
2

See note 51 infra.

8 See note 50 infra.

4 See note 98 infra.
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that oral modification was impossible. However, an exception should be
created to prevent the statute from being used as a shield for fraud;
one who promises to modify a contract to obtain performance by another and then uses the statute to protect himself from the reciprocal
obligation should not be protected.
With an unwavering eye on increasing certainty of contract, the
Commission proposed two statutes that could have had a damaging
effect on the law of contract modifications in New York. The court
of appeals avoided this result through judicial amendment of the
statutes. The historic backdrop and present status of this problem will
now be examined.
I.

INFORMAL MODIFICATION: CONSIDERATION THEORY

An enforcement device is a signal, sanctioned by the state, that communicates to private parties and to enforcement agencies when an
enforceable agreement 5 has been made. When this signal is a standardized act, such as the affixation of a seal or signing of a document,
the enforcement device is formal, its ultimate nature being predetermined by the state. When the signal is not standardized, as in the
series of acts constituting a bargained-for exchange, the enforcement
device is informal, its ultimate nature being determined by the parties'
negotiations.
Consideration is an informal enforcement device. An original contract using this informal device is enforced only when the parties
have established a bargained-for exchange." How can this bargain be
changed? It was generally believed that the modification of a preexisting contract was enforceable only when an additional consideration supported the change. This conclusion was consistent with the rule
for enforcing informal original contracts and was supported by the same
reasoning. An examination of the cases reveals that the court of appeals
never adopted this rule, but rather enforced a larger set of informal
modifications by requiring only a direct proof of the parties' consent
to the change.
Bartlett v. Wyman 7 introduced the traditional rule for informal
modification. Wyman had shipped on the brig Regent with articles
that specified wages of seventeen dollars a month. Wyman sued Bartlett, the ship's master, on a set of modified articles that increased his
5 "Agreement" is defined to include original contracts and modifications.
9 The use of promissory estoppel to support original contracts in New York is limited.
See I A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACts § 193-209 (1950).
7 14 Johns. 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1817). NEw YORK LAw REvisioN COMMISSION, REPORT,
RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 248 n.22 (1936) [hereinafter cited as L.R.C. REPORT].
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wages to thirty dollars a month. The court accepted Bartlett's claim
that just before the crew demanded increased wages, "there was
a rumour at Savannah that an embargo was about to be laid by congress
[sic], which occasioned a rise in seamen's wages, and many other sailors,
in the port of Savannah, left their vessels, and went on board of
others."" The Regent's crew then threatened to leave ship unless their
wages were increased, and as a result Bartlett modified the shipping
articles.
Expanding on one of the five grounds given by the court for its
reversal of Wyman's jury verdict, later courts have cited the case as
holding that: "[A] promise made to induce a party to do that which
he is already bound by contract to perform is without consideration." 9
They failed to state that the Bartlett court viewed the modification as
tainted by economic coercion.' 0
That same month another case was decided, Lattimore v. Harsen,11
which established a rule that is contrary to the traditional view of
Bartlett. Harsen had a contract with Lattimore to build a cartway.
They also agreed to a liquidated damages penalty if the contract were
breached. The contract was later modified, 12 and the court enforced
this modification. The court in Lattimore did not mention the Bartlett decision; it enforced the modification, ostensibly because a waiver
of the liquidated damages provided for in the original contract was a
consideration for the modification.'3 However, this could not constitute additional consideration, for whenever a contract is breached,
the defaulting party takes the risk of paying damages. The risk in
Lattimore was no greater, as a court is not bound by private penalties.
What then explains the apparent inconsistency in these decisions?
8 14 Johns. at 261. Wyman offered evidence that "there had been no difference, or dispute, between him [Bartlett] and his crew" that would have forced Bartlett into signing
the articles. Id. at 260. When the articles were produced in court an indorsement was
included that had been made without the crew's knowledge: "The seamen having demanded an increase of wages, and being apprehensive that they might desert if this
was not done, these articles were drawn up as a mere matter of form; it is, however,
understood that the articles signed in New-York [sic] are to bind, and those signed here
to be of no avail .. " Id. at 261.
9 Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 202, 131 N.E. 887, 889. (1921).
10 14 Johns. at 262.
11 14 Johns. 330 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1817).
12 In the words of the court, Lattimore "became dissatisfied with [the] contract, and
determined to abandon it. The defendant then agreed, if they would go on and complete
the work, he would pay them by the day for such service, and the materials found,
without reference to the written contract." Id.
13 "[I]f [Lattimore] chose to incur this penalty, [he] had a right to do so, and notice
of such intention was given to the defendant, upon which he entered into the new
arrangement. Here was a sufflident consideration for this promise .. ."Id. at 331.
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It seems that the Bartlett rule rested on a finding of economic coercion.
In Bartlett the rumor of an embargo had caused a general rise in
seamen's wages, which left the ship's master no choice but to accede
to the crew's demands. In Lattimore there was nothing to indicate a
general rise in the market for contractors. 14 Lattimore, in the light of
Bartlett, suggests that the enforcement device for an informal modification is consent and that the existence of economic coercion negates this

consent. The failure of the court to frame its decisions specifically in
terms of consent theory helps to explain the notion that New York had
two independent lines of authority in the area of contract modification. 5
In 1921 the court of appeals moved closer to an explicit statement of
a consent rule in Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc.16 Schwartzreich
entered an employment contract with Bauman-Basch at a salary of ninety
dollars per week, but before beginning work he received an offer of
higher wages from another firm. Using this as leverage, Schwartzreich
obtained a raise of ten dollars per week from Bauman-Basch. After
Schwartzreich's discharge in December of that year, he brought an
action for damages under the modified contract.
The court agreed that Bauman-Basch's defense of no additional
consideration would have been controlling if the second agreement
had been a modification. "Where, however, an existing contract is
terminated by consent of both parties and a new one executed in its
place and stead, we have a different situation and the mutual promises
are again a consideration.' 7 Although the court used language from
the Lattimore line of cases to support this statement,' 8 it cited no
14 This is not to suggest that it is impossible for there to have been economic coercion,
but simply that there were no implications in the report of the case.
15 See, e.g., 1936 L.R.C. REP RT 248.
16 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
17 231 N.Y. at 203, 131 N.E. at 889.
18 231 N.Y. at 202. 131 N.E. at 889.
Several cases appeared after Lattimore that followed its scheme. In Hart v. Lauman, 29
Barb. 410, 416 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1859), the court said: "[V]hat took place between the
parties, followed as it was by the plaintiff's quitting the work, was such a rescission of
the original contract in respect to that portion of the work, as would have precluded
the defendants from maintaining an action to recover damages for its nonperformance,
afterwards. The parties were then in a situation to make a new agreement, for that
part of the work, which would be binding, and would control, instead of the first
agreement." See Stewart & Howell v. Keteltas, 36 N.Y. 388, 392 (1867); Spier v. Hyde, 78
App. Div. 151, 158 (1903).
In one very interesting court of appeals opinion the conceptual scheme of Lattimore
was not followed, and the change in the original contract was enforced; Judge Wright
stated: "It is conceded that the parties might have cancelled the agreement, and, if they
could do this, they could certainly modify it." Meech v. The City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y. 198,
213-14 (1864). However, while the other members of the court agreed with Judge
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precedent for the proposition that the rescission of an old contract
and execution of a new contract could be simultaneous. Professors
Corbin and Williston believed that this distinction between "modification" and simultaneous rescission plus "new" contract, rested on
form and was without basis in substance. 19
Looking to form, the court made one distinction to separate these
two methods of changing a contract: "The determining factor is the
rescission by consent. Provided this is the expressed and acted upon
intention, the time of the rescission, whether a moment before or at
the same time as the making of the new contract, is unimportant."' 0 However, the reported facts of the case do not support this proposition.
There is nothing in Mr. Bauman's testimony for the defendant that
Wright's conclusion, Judge Johnson was moved to justify the conclusion on grounds
more clearly in line with the Lattimore language: "But the first contract was not the one
under which the work was done. It was commenced under the first contract, but was
continued and completed under a new contract, which provided for the payment of an

amount equal to both assessments." Id. at 218. It may have been that the good judge was
disturbed by the suggestion that a contract could be modified without additional consideration.
The Lattimore and Bartlett lines seem to have been cited together only once. After
discussing the Bartlett line of cases, the court of appeals explained that: "It would
doubtless be competent for parties to cancel an existing contract and make a new one
to complete the same work at a different rate of compensation, but it seems that it would
be essential to its validity that there should be a valid cancellation of the original
contract. Such was the case of Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (1817)." Vanderbilt v.
Schreyer, 91 N.Y. 392, 402 (1883) (emphasis added). The court moved closer to Schwartzreich, implying that the real distinction between the two lines of authority is the existence
of a good faith modification: "It necessarily follows from these authorities that the
plaintiff had no right to impose, as a condition to the performance of his contract, that
the payment of said mortgage should be guaranteed." Id. (emphasis added). However,
the parties might have agreed that the defendant should guarantee performance of the
contract and the court would have waived the requirement of an additional consideration
by using the Lattimore line of cases. Yet, it still remained for the Schwartzreich court to
bring the Lattimore and Bartlett lines to a direct confrontation by stating that the
rescission and new contract could be created simultaneously; in addition, the court for
the first time made dear that the Lattimore line was based on a consent rule.
19 "But unless the mutual rescission is distinctly antecedent in time to the new agreement.... the case falls exactly within the terms of the supposed general rule, there is no
true rescission, and the distinction drawn is a distinction without a difflerence." Corbin,
Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78, 80 (1923). "The plaintiff gets judgment, therefore, not because he had promised anything new or anything that he was not
at the instant of the promise under an existing duty to do, not because there is a
'difference in principle' between a modification and this kind of a 'recission,' but because we want him to have the money that the defendant promised. To reach this
result we should say in words, what we must say in effect, that on facts like these doing
or promising to do what one is under an existing legal duty to do is a sufficient consideration for a promise." Id. at 81-82 n.11. See Williston, Consideration in Bilateral
Contracts, 27 HAv. L. R v. 503, 516 (1914).
20 231 N.Y. at 203-04, 131 N.E. at 890.
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approximates a statement of "rescission." 21 Schwartzreich testified that
Mr. Bauman had said "you do not want this contract any more because
the new one takes its place." 22 Apparently the court felt this was an
"expressed" statement of rescission. If the court were not formalistic
enough to require the exact term "rescission," it is difficult to see the
difference in form between "modification" and rescission followed by
a "new" contract. Certainly Mr. Bauman's statement could have been
made if this had been a mere modification.2 Looking to substance, the
court justified distinguishing modification from rescission plus "new"
contract by stating that "where the new contract gives any new privilege
or advantage to the promisee, a consideration has been recognized .... "2 4 Yet, logically, this same statement could also be applied
to a modified contract. It is true that the later reading of Bartlett
required an additional consideration from the promisee to support a
for
modification, but the court gave no reason for changing the rule
"new" contracts-it merely declared a difference in principle. 25
Thus, the court extended Lattimore to allow a simultaneous rescission of the original contract and the creation of a "new" contract.
Yet, the Bartlettrule for "modification" agreements was not overruled.
Although the court seemed to grant itself an unjustified discretion to
enforce or defeat changes in contract terms simply by selecting one of
two essentially identical categories, a careful examination of Schwartzreich demonstrates that the court was concerned with an important
distinction.
When Schwartzreich was decided the old fear of enforcing a modification obtained by economic coercion had not been forgotten, and
21 Id. at 199-200, 131 N.E. at 88.
22 Id. at 200, 131 N.E. at 889.

23 The Commission also had trouble deciding what the court meant by the term
rescission": "Some evidence in addition to the making of the new contract is, therefore,
necessary to a finding of rescission of the old contract. Such evidence will usually be
statements made by the parties, but, as in the case under discussion, it may also be acts
such as the discarding of the old writing and the execution of the new one." 1936
L.R.C. REP RT 255. Significantly, neither the Commission nor the court made any attempt to distinguish the type of act or statement that would separate a modification
from the simultaneous rescission plus new contract.
24 231 N.Y. at 203, 131 N.E. at 889.
25 Triangle Waist Co. v. Todd, 223 N.Y. 27, 119 N.E. 85 (1918), was cited as authority
for the rule that no additional consideration is needed to enforce the "new" contract.
The facts of the Triangle case do not support that proposition. There the second agreement "gave the plaintiff [the promisor, not the promisee, as suggested by the Schwartzreich
statement] an option to renew the employment for a second year. This was a right which
the first agreement did not give; and hence, there was no lack of consideration for the
larger rate of payment." Id. at 29, 119 N.E. at 85. Thus, Triangle nestles comfortably
within the traditional statement of Bartlett; the facts of the Schwartzreich case lack this
exchange of an additional consideration.
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for this reason, the court stated that in deciding the question of enforceability "the determining factor [was] the rescission by consent."26
Through the word "consent" the court implied that a good faith
agreement was the standard for deciding whether a modified contract
was enforceable.2 7 If economic coercion were suspected, the court could
invoke Bartlett and claim that the acts of the parties had created a
modification which failed for lack of additional consideration. If economic coercion were not present, the court could invoke Lattimore and
enforce the modified contract without additional consideration by calling it a simultaneous rescission followed by a new contract.
It may appear strange that the court did not bring Bartlett and
Lattimore together to create a single rule for all changes in original
contracts. However, a single rule based explicitly on the existence of
consent to the change could well have stirred up dissent among the
advocates of consideration theory. Furthermore, an explicit consent
rule would have focused attention on the court's reluctance to define
the elements of consent, a definition that would have been difficult to
28
make at that time.
26 231 N.Y. at 203, 131 N.E. at 890 (emphasis added). The term "consent" was used more
than once: "Where, however, an existing contract is terminated, by consent of both parties
and a new one executed in its place and stead, we have a different situation and the mutual
promises are again a consideration." Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 203,
131 N.E. 889 (1921).
27 At the time Schwartzreich was decided,. "consent" was defined as a concurrence of
wills. "[C]onsent supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious,
determined, and free use of these powers." 1 Bouvwa, LAw DImrsoNAY 611 (8th ed. 1914).
The definition of the term "consent" suggests that at the very least the court was thinking in terms of not enforcing modifications obtained by economic coercion: undue influence and duress of goods. The idea that a private agreement must be the result of a
serious and determined act was the thrust of the undue influence defense in equity; the
defense was initially aimed "at protection for the mentally or physically inadequate,
whose inadequacy fell short of a total lack of legal capacity." Dawson, Economic DuressAn Essay in Perspective, 45 Micmr. L. Rxv. 253, 262 (1947). Later, during the nineteenth
century, "[t]he test for the existence of undue influence became the presence or absence
of 'free agency'." Id. at 263. The idea that a private agreement must be the result of a
freely given act was the essence of the duress of goods cases; "[i]t became necessary to
demonstrate not merely that the means used were wrongful, by the tests of the criminal
law or the law of tort, but also that the result was substantial interference with freedom
of choice, at the particular time and place." Id. at 256.
28 The Schwartzreich case was at law, not equity. Even as much as seven years after
the Schwartzreich decision the court suggested that in the area of economic coercion distinctions between law and equity remained: "[U]ndue influence and duress have legal
definitions which are applied in the common-law courts .... but the use of these terms
in equity is wider and less precise." Scheinberg v. Scheinberg, 249 N.Y. 277, 282, 164 N.E.
98, 99 (1928). The court may have been unwilling to tie itself down to the then existing
definitions of duress or undue influence and at the same time been unwilling to create
definite precedent broadening those defenses. "[T]he problem of the unequal exchange
must be approached in terms of the specific conditions which affect the bargaining power
and the motivations of individuals in particular transactions. This mode of analysis re-
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What then are the implications of adopting consent as an enforcement device for informal modifications? Looking at the enforcement
device as a limitation on the scope of enforceable modifications, the consent rule allows a greater number of modifications to be enforced than
would an enforcement device of additional consideration. In addition,
since the definition of a modification presupposes an enforceable
original contract, the use of an "easier" rule for modifications than
for original contracts raises the possibility that a seemingly enforceable modification will be invalid because the original contract was
unenforceable. If the original contract is not examined, the court risks
enforcing modified gratuitous contracts and thereby frustrating the
guarding function of the bargained-for exchange requirement for
original contracts. The court must also distinguish modifications from
original contracts in order to avoid enforcing a gratuitous original
contract as if it were a modification.
Viewing the enforcement device solely as a signal of the parties' intention, the consent rule stands up well in an area heavily populated
with nonprofessionals. The requirement of a bargained-for exchange in
the original contract is based on the assumption that when the parties
provide for such an exchange they intend to create a binding agreement. Yet, that is merely a prediction of their actual intention. Under
Schwartzreich intent is never presumed; it must be proved. Had additional consideration been selected as the enforcement device the
parties' intent would again be presumed. Certain defenses would then
be made available by the court to rebut the presumption of intent
raised by the existence of additional consideration, thereby avoiding
the enforcement of nonconsensual agreements. However, parties intending to create a valid modification without additional consideration would be prevented from doing so. An indiscriminate requirement of additional consideration then results in a demand that one
party make a gift to the other, something not the product of private
negotiation. This would be a substitution of the court's judgment for
29
that of the parties'.
quires a survey in each case, not only of the gains and losses involved in the transaction
itself, but of the means employed in the bargaining processes that precede it." Dawson,
supra note 27, at 282.
29 Schwartzreich could be read as recognizing goodwill as sufficient consideration. For
example, a price reduction on a contract between manufacturer and wholesaler might
reflect a recent, general trend in the market. While the manufacturer could hold the
wholesaler to their earlier agreement, he may consider it good business practice to modify
the contract. Schwartzreich could also be read as reflecting the values of a changing
society; since society may have been willing to sanction the use of leverage to obtain
a modification, the court should follow suit by eliminating the requirement of an additional consideration. This would also require narrowing the defense of economic coercion.
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While it may be that the consent rule elevated freedom of contract
over certainty of contract, this was unavoidable. The certainty generated by the presumptions inherent in a preselected signal can never
be obtained by amateurs, but only by knowledgeable professionals. Yet,
the decision was criticized by the Law Revision Commission for the
uncertainty that it generated for business transactions:
Whether the evidence shows an intention by both parties to
rescind the old contract will in most cases be a question for
the jury. Thus, until the jury decides, the contractual rights
of the parties can only be described by a prediction of what
a jury will do, always an uncertain process.30
Unless the court is willing to prohibit the enforcement of all informal modifications or to enforce all informal modifications regardless of the parties' actual intent, the contractual rights of the parties
must always be uncertain; the actual intent of the parties, whether ascertained through an enforcement device of consent or by a defense
to the presumption of enforceability, must always be a question for
future determination. There is nothing that the parties can do at the
time of modification to conclusively establish that the transaction
had the consent of both parties. If in fact there are professionals to
take advantage of the presumptions inherent in a preselected signal,
certainty of contract can be increased for these persons. That the court
recognized this possibility can be inferred from its revival of the seal,
discussed in the next section. However, this device was used to supplement, not replace, the very flexible, informal enforcement device of
consent.
II. FoRmAL MODIFICATION: THE ShAL
The creation of a consent rule for modifications leads to questioning
the bargained-for exchange requirement for original informal contracts. Yet, the court did not broaden the informal enforcement
device and eliminate the consideration requirement; if it had, the
gratuitous agreement would have been enforceable. Advocates of consideration theory claimed that gratuitous agreements were often made
without consent to enforcement, and, even with such consent, were not
important enough to be enforced. Had consent been selected as the
enforcement device for all informal agreements, the parties' intent
would have been a question for the jury, and this would have eliminated the need to preclude the enforcement of gratuitous agreements
30 1936 L.R.C. REPORT 255.
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on the basis of a prediction. Whether such agreements were important enough to justify use of court time and money should have
been determined by examining the needs of the business community.
The court did make the gratuitous agreement enforceable, however,
by breathing new life into a crippled formal enforcement device, the
seal. Under early New York case law the seal was an effective alternative to consideration as an enforcement device for modifications. 1 This
was altered by an 1830 statute which provided that the seal was only
"presumptive evidence of sufficient consideration." 32 The statute survived in basically the same form until September 1, 1935;11 throughout
this period the court of appeals held that a sealed instrument could
be defeated by evidence of want or failure of consideration.34 The
court's interpretation of the 1830 legislation eliminated the seal as an
effective enforcement alternative to consideration; in 1937 this interpretation was reversed.
This striking reversal was made in Cochran v. Taylor.35 Taylor gave
Chenault a sealed option to purchase certain property, which he revoked a month later on the ground that it was without consideration.
Chenault then assigned the option to Cochran, who subsequently notified Taylor that he had elected to purchase the property. When Taylor
refused to perform, Cochran brought an action for specific performance.
The trial court's finding that the option was nudum pactum was
affirmed by the appellate division. After reviewing the modifications
of the seal legislation from 1818-1935, the court of appeals concluded
that "[t]he question of sufficiency of consideration has always been open
to inquiry and the statute is merely declaratory of the common law,
but the consideration implied by the seal cannot be impeached for the
31 Parker v. Parmele, 20 Johns. 130, 134 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1822).
32 "In every action upon a sealed instrument, and where a set-off is founded upon any
sealed instrument, the seal thereof shall only be presumptive evidence of a sufficient
consideration, which may be rebutted in the same manner, and to the same extent, as
if such instrument were not sealed." 2 N.Y. Rxv. STAT. 406, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3 (1829).
33 Lloyd, Consideration and the Seal in New York-An Unsatisfactory Legislative Program, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 2 n.3 (1946).
The 1935 version of the statute eliminated the effectiveness of the seal as an enforcement device: "A seal upon a written instrument hereafter executed shall not be received
as conclusive or presumptive evidence of a sufficient consideration. A written instrument,
hereafter executed, which modifies, varies or cancels a sealed instrument, executed prior
to the effective date of this section, shall not be deemed invalid or ineffectual because
of the absence of a seal thereon." N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Aar § 342, later amended by N.Y. LAws
1403, ch. 708, § 1 (1955). For a complete history of the seal legislation in New York, 19351937, see Lloyd, supra at 7-9.
34 Lloyd, supra note 33, at 4-5.
35 273 N.Y. 172, 7 N.E.2d 89 (1937).
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purpose of invalidating the instrument or destroying its character as
a speciality." 36 It held that the option was enforceable:
[I]n the face of the tremendous number of business transactions
open to investigation by the courts, reason continues to dictate
and necessity to require more forcefully than before that a
should be estopped to assert want
party to a sealed instrument
37
of consideration.
The court explicitly allowed the seal to be used as an enforcement device for original gratuitous contracts.
Since there were no decisions of the court pertaining to formal modifications, the rules for formal modifications can be obtained only by
extending the reasoning of Cochran. There are two justifications for
such an extension. As early as 1817, a sealed contract could be modified
informally.38 Thus, an original gratuitous contract enforceable under
Cochran could be informally modified under the consent rule in
Schwartzreich; without any extension of Cochran beyond its facts, the
modified gratuitous contract was enforceable. By extending the Cochran rule to modifications, the number of potentially enforceable modifications is not increased; this simply allows a formal as well as an
informal modification of a formal original contract. Support for this
extension is found in earlier New York case law, where the seal was
held to be an appropriate enforcement device for modifications. 39 In
addition, language in Cochran suggested that the seal could be used to
enforce a modification; the court referred to a "sealed instrument," a
40
phrase that is not limited to original contracts.
The court's policy statement 4' established two criteria for the enforcement of a sealed agreement in the absence of consideration: a) The
instrument must be the result of a "business transaction." This term
is not defined, but, whatever the meaning, it is clear from the second
requirement that not all sealed "business transactions" will be protected. b) "[A] party to a sealed instrument should be estopped to
assert want of consideration." Where the parties did not attempt to
establish consideration they have relied solely on the enforceability of
the seal; and, as a result, lack of consideration is no defense. This implies
that when a sealed instrument has recitals of consideration the parties
36 Id. at 180, 7 N.E.2d at 91 (citations omitted).
37 Id. at 179, 7 N.E2d at 91.

38 Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1817).
39 Parker v. Parmele, 20 Johns. 130 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1822).
40 This opinion has been interpreted to indicate that the court desired to revive the
seal in New York, establishing an enforcement device for gratuitous promises. Lloyd,
supra note 33, at 13. See also 1941 L.R.C. REPORT 357-60.
41 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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should not be estopped to assert insufficiency of consideration. The
agreement will not be supported as if the parties had intended a purely
voluntary promise.
In applying the Cochran rule to formal modifications, the pitfalls
surrounding application of the consent rule to informal modifications
are avoided. Only when a different rule is created for modifications,
as compared to original contracts, must a court be concerned with the
definition of a modification; only then does it risk expanding or limiting the number of potentially enforceable agreements by incorrect
labeling and consequent mistreatment of an agreement. Since the
Cochran requirements are applicable to original contracts as well as to
modifications, the labeling of an agreement is irrelevant. This is true
whether the agreement is a formal modification of an informal contract,
a formal modification of a formal contract, or a formal original contract.
If in either of the first two examples the original contracts were not
enforceable, the agreement would be treated as an original contract,
and thus the validity of the original contract would not affect the
result.
The Cochrancriteria for the enforcement of a sealed instrument were
soon broadened by the decision in United States Trust v. Frelinghuysen,2 which eliminated the "business transaction" requirement. It
is clear that Frelinghuysen created an enforcement device of very
broad scope. The consideration theory on which Schwartzreich was
based required a bargained-for exchange to be established in the original contract before a modification could be enforced under the consent
rule; this categorically eliminated the enforcement of modified gratuitous contracts. In Cochran, the court required the sealed instrument
to be gratuitous and the product of a "business transaction"; these
requirements opened the realm of enforceable modifications to business
gifts, options and other business transactions that lacked consideration
in the original contract. When in Frelinghuysen the court eliminated
the Cochran requirement of a "business transaction," all modifications
of gratuitous contracts became potentially enforceable.
The court's selection of a formal enforcement device to support
gratuitous agreements was aimed at the knowledgeable professional.
There was only one act, the affixation of a seal, that entitled the gratuitous agreement to be enforced. If the court had created a consent rule
for all informal agreements, the amateur would have obtained a similar
power, for such a rule eliminates the need for prior knowledge of a
selected signal. This does not imply that the court favored professionals.
A formal instrument carries the presumption of enforceability, which
42 288 N.Y. 463, 43 N.E.2d 492 (1942).
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nonconsent. 43

A consent
can be defeated only by a successful defense of
rule for informal agreements never presumes intent, but rather requires
that it be proved. The greater demands on court time and money necessitated by this requirement may have made it impossible to develop
an informal consent device for amateurs. In addition, knowledge of
the seal's magic would spread over time, and the unfairness associated
with the formal device would diminish. Thus, the court's selection of
a formal channel to extend enforcement to gratuitous agreements was
a justified restriction on freedom of contract.
On the surface, it seems that the use of a formal enforcement device
increased certainty of contract, since the affixation of the seal symbolized an enforceable agreement. Yet, the presumption of enforceability inherent in a formal agreement is rebuttable by the defenses of
nonconsent 4 Thus, the increase of certainty of contract is inversely
proportional to the scope of recognized nonconsent defenses. As long as
these defenses are adequate, it cannot be said that the court achieved
certainty of contract at the expense of enforcing nonconsensual agreements.
Although legislation deprived Cochran and Frelinghuysen of long
term commercial significance, 45 these decisions were important. The
court of appeals emphatically stated that the realm of enforceable
agreements should extend beyond the limits of consideration theory.
The court selected a formal enforcement device to make this extension.
While it apparently was willing to accept the consequent reduction of
freedom of contract, it was not willing to increase certainty of contract
at the expense of enforcing nonconsensual agreements.
III. FoRmAL MODIFICATION: TiH STATUTE
A. An Introduction
A new formal enforcement device for modifications, section 33(2) of
the Personal Property Laws, was established by the legislature in 1934
43 The Cochran court recognized that the presumption of intent inherent in the seal was
rebuttable: "[Tjhe contract was enforceable by the assignee in an action for specific per-

formance, in the absence of any available and satisfactorily established defense or counterclaim .... " 273 N.Y. at 184, 7 N.E.2d at 93. This statement was supported by citing
Pomeroy: "This rule generally operates in favor of defendants . . . . The oppression or
hardship may result from unconscionable provisions of the contract itself; or it may
result from the situation of the parties, unconnected with the terms of the contract or

with the circumstances of its negotiation and execution . . ...4 J. PoM-aoy, Equrry
JURISPRUDENcE § 1405, at 3333 n.6 (4th ed. 1919).
44

See note 43 supra.

45

This was recognized by the court in a caveat restricting the effect of its opinion to

instruments executed and delivered prior to Sept. 1, 1985. Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y.
180-81, 7 N.E.2d 91-92 (1937).
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to remedy the flaws found in the consent rule and the seal by the Law
Revision Commission. Schwartzreich's consent rule for informal modifications had been misinterpreted, 46 and thus criticized for its emphasis
on form 47 and its tendency to increase uncertainty in the enforcement
of modifications. 48 The revival of the seal in Cochranand Frelinghuysen
was viewed as an unwarranted extension of the range of enforceable
agreements.4 9 Consequently, the Law Revision Commission 5° recommended a formal enforcement device for modifications included in a
signed writing.5 An examination of the court of appeals' and the Com46 See note 19 and section I supra.
47 "Since the parties to any contract may by cancelling or rescinding the contract and
executing a new one change any of their rights or obligations, with no consideration
passing other than the exchange of the new promises, why should a modifying agreement be less binding? Should not the parties to a contract be able to do directly what
they are permitted to do indirectly?" 1936 L.R.C. REPORT 74.
48 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
49 Three objections were made to the court's revival of the seal as an effective alternative enforcement device. It was claimed that the seal had degenerated to a printed "L.S."
which "[t]o the average man . . . conveys no meaning" 1941 L.R.C. REPORT 359. This
empirical statement cut deeply into the theoretical justification for enforcing a formal
instrument-its spedal form was thought to give notice to the parties that they were
creating legal rights and obligations. In addition, if the recital of a sealing were lacking,
the character of the instrument had to rest on parol evidence of intent, established
after execution of the instrument. Transbel Inv. Co. v. Venetos, 279 N.Y. 207, 18 N.E2d
129 (1938). This would diminish the certainty hoped to be created by the enforcement
of sealed instruments. Yet, the most important objection concerned the seal's scope of
enforcement: "Concerning the broader question whether, and to what extent, a person
should be able to bind himself by a promise without consideration, the Commission
doubts the wisdom of any device that is applicable to all kinds of promises under all
circumstances." 1941 L.R.C. REPORT 359-60.
50 In 1934 the New York legislature created the Law Revision Commission, N.Y. LAws
1289, ch. 547, § 1 (1934), and charged it with the duty of examining "the common law
and statutes of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering
defects and anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms." 1935 L.R.C.
RErORT 7.
51 Before the Commission was created, the legislature adopted § 33(2), which created a
statutory enforcement device for limited types of modifications: "A mutual agreement
between a creditor or obligee and a debtor, obligor, surety or guarantor to extend or postpone to a fixed or determinable future time the payment of any debt or other obligation
shall be valid without consideration other than such mutual agreement, provided that a
note or memorandum of such agreement be in writing and signed by the parties thereto."
N.Y. LAws 606, ch. 142, § 1 (1934). The Commission approved of this basic policy as it
would "make the requirement of consideration applicable to promises generally, making
no distinction between sealed and unsealed promises, with express statutory provision that
in specified cases a promise, in writing, shall not be unenforceable because of the absence
of consideration." 1941 L.R.C. REPoRT 360. Yet the Commission believed that the 1934
version of the statute was limited without justification: "If a written agreement between
debtor and creditor extending the time for the payment of any debt or obligation be
binding without consideration, why should a written agreement between the parties to a
contract modifying other provisions of the contract require a consideration for its
validity? 1936 L.R.C. REPoRT 74. As a result, the Commission recommended amending
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mission's interpretations of section 33(2) is necessary to determine the
present boundaries of the realm of enforceable modifications and the
degree to which uncertainty in the enforcement of modifications has
been diminshed. The success of this new enforcement device can only
be measured by its ability to eliminate the flaws found in the earlier
enforcement devices. The following discussion concludes that this
simple solution for a difficult problem had limited success.
B. The Realm of Enforceable Modifications
Consideration theory required a bargained-for exchange in the original contract before the Schwartzreich consent rule could be applied to
a modification of the contract. The Frelinghuysenrule for formal modifications eliminated this requirement and made all formal modifications
of gratuitous contracts potentially enforceable. The enforcement device created under section 33(2) presents two interesting questions.
Must the original contract have a bargained-for exchange to be capable
of modification under the statute? What requirements will be established for the modification itself?
1. The Modified Gratuitous Contract. In Frelinghuysen the court
made original gratuitous contracts enforceable, a result that the Commission disliked.5 2 What then did the Commission expect under section
33(2) when either a gift contract or a "gratuitous" business contract was
modified in writing and signed by both parties?5" Since these contracts
could no longer be enforced as original contracts,5 4 is it reasonable to
believe that once they were modified section 33(2) provided an enforcement device? The Commission wanted section 33(2) to require that
the original contract be legally enforceable before the modification
could be enforced. 55 If this were not done, gratuitous contracts would
become enforceable once modified.
§ 33(2): "An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to discharge in whole or
in part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest in
personal or real property, shall not be invalid because of the absence of consideration,
provided that the agreement changing, modifying or discharging such contract, obligation,
lease, mortgage or security interest, shall be in writing and signed by the party against
whom it is sought to enforce the change, modification or discharge." 1936 L.R.C. REPoRT
79. In 1936 the recommendation was adopted by the legislature. N.Y. LAws ch. 281, § 1
(1936), now N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 5-1103.
52 "The Commission denies the desirability of enforcing gift promises or business
promises where no consideration is intended. It has recommended that enforcement be
denied such promises, to which recommendation the Legislature has acceded. The court
has expressed its disapproval. It has affirmed the desirability of enforcing such promises,
and has indicated its intention to enforce them ...." Lloyd, supra note 33, at 22.
53 It is assumed that this is a gratuitous business promise not validated by any other
subdivision of section 33.
54 The seal is no longer a valid enforcement device. See note 33 supra.
55 "[O]nce a binding contract had been made the parties thereto should be empowered
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The statute, however, is open to several interpretations: I) "An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to discharge in whole or
in part, any contract ... ." The term used is "any contract," not any

legally enforceable contract. Yet, it could be argued that the word
"contract" should be defined to include only enforceable promises.
2) "[S]hall not be invalid because of the absence of consideration." Had the Commission desired to prevent the enforcement of
modified gratuitous contracts (where a bargained-for exchange is lacking in the original contract) and still allow the enforcement of gratuitously modified contracts (where additional consideration is lacking
in the modification), the statute should have been phrased: "shall not
be invalid because of the absence of additional consideration," thereby
eliminating the traditional reading of Bartlett. As the statute now
reads, it can be argued that since a modification cannot be challenged for "the absence of consideration," the modified gift contract
and the modified gratuitous business contract are enforceable. It seems
likely, given the position taken by the court in Frelinghuysen, that it
would find this argument appealing. However, this question has yet to
be decided.
2. What Is the Definition of a Modification Under Section 33(2)?
If the original contract must have a bargained-for exchange to be modified under section 33(2), the court of appeals must also define modification; whenever different rules are created for original contracts and
modifications this problem must be solved or the court risks limiting
or expanding the realm of enforceable agreements through inadvertence. The Commission's examination of Aldine Metal Products Corp.
v. Bogert & Carlough Co.18 resulted in an interesting statement on
this question. The Bogert Company had contracted with Aldine to
purchase window frames at an agreed price.5 7 Bogert then agreed in
writing to reimburse Aldine for the cost of purchasing production
tools. Bogert later broke this promise, and an action was brought to
recover damages for the breach. The trial court's decision to enforce
the modification was reversed by the appellate division 5s and the reversal was sustained by the court of appeals. The Commission ignored
the procedural point raised by the appellate division 59 and emphasized
to change the terms of that contract, or to discharge obligations thereunder, by mutual
agreement without additional consideration, provided the agreement modifying or discharging the contract is in writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought to
be enforced." 1936 L.R.C. REPORT 79 (emphasis added).
56 296 N.Y. 710, 70 N.E.2d 535 (1946).
57 In fact, the agreement was made with Aldine's assignor, but for present purposes
that aspect of the case is not significant.
58 270 App. Div. 897, 61 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1946).
59 Id. at 898, 61 N.Y.&.2d at 72.
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the appellate division's statement that section 33(2) "does not provide
that an original promise made without consideration is enforce60
able."
The Commission suggested this was only one of many cases "where
it will be difficult to determine whether an agreement constitutes a
'modification' of an existing liability or is the undertaking of a new
obligation which must be supported by consideration to be enforceable." 61 Since a definitive statement could only have proven arbitrary, no criteria were set out to determine what nexus was sufficient
to make the second agreement a modification instead of an original
contract. While the court refused to enforce this agreement, the reasoning behind a memorandum opinion speaks softly, if at all; certainly
the Commission's reasoning could not be ascribed to the court. It will
prove interesting to watch for signs of this reasoning in future opinions, for the definition of the requisite nexus will determine the range
of agreements enforceable under section 33(2).
Feyh v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. 62 also impliedly asked the court to
define a modification. Feyh ordered two printing presses from Brandtjen; the written contract included a price escalator clause, allowing
price increases "to effective permitted legal prices prevailing on date
of shipment." 63 Delivery was delayed for eighteen months due to a strike
in the Brandtjen plant, and when the presses were delivered Feyh
was notified of a 1700 dollar price increase. Feyh signed the notes and
chattel mortgage connected with the transaction, but when Brandtjen's
agent changed the terms of Feyh's copy of the original contract Feyh
did not sign.6 4 Six months after delivery Feyh brought suit to void
the contract on the grounds of economic coercion.
Was the change in the original contract a modification under section
33(2)? The court of appeals' memorandum affirmed the appellate
division ruling that the agreement was enforceable. Though Brandtjen argued that the agreement was supported by section 33(2),65 this
should not have been accepted by the court. The original agreement
anticipated the change in price and provided an escalator clause; thus,
there is consideration for the change in the original contract.66 This
60 Id.
61 1948 L.R.C. REPORT 654.
62 3 N.Y.2d 971, 146 N.E.2d 794, 169 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1957).
63 3 N.Y.2d at 972.
64 207 Misc. 171, 174, 138 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
65 3 N.Y.2d at 973.
66 See Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370
(1921). Cardozo, J. stated: "We find no lack of consideration for the concession of an
option. The privilege to order more is coupled with the promise and obligation to accept
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is to be distinguished from a modification, a second agreement that
was not anticipated by the original contract. Here, assent to the escalator clause was given in the original agreement, and no later assent
was required. Calling such changes modifications could eliminate the
requirement of a bargained-for exchange for all original contracts with
an open-ended
term, since they would be enforceable under section
7

33(2) .6

However, even assuming that this was a modification, the agreement did not fulfill the conditions of the statute. Feyh did not sign
the modified contract; he signed only the notes and the chattel mortgage. The signing of collateral obligations should not be construed
to come within the meaning of the term "agreement" in the statute,
when there was a written modification that could have been, but was
not, signed. The presumption of intent inherent in section 33(2) was
justified, since adopting parties understand the signing of a modification to be a legally binding act. The same awareness should not be
attributed to the signing of a collateral obligation, especially when
the promisee refused to sign the actual modification. In addition, requiring a signed writing reduces the chances of enforcing false modifications. If the signing of a collateral obligation which does not
incorporate all the terms of the agreement is deemed to satisfy the
statute, this protection would be severely reduced.
The cases demonstrate that it is no simple task to define a modification. To date, both the court and the Commission have refused, and
accordingly, no conclusion can be reached regarding section 33(2)'s
range of enforcement. The debate over enforcement of the modified
gratuitous promise is still unsettled. Yet, despite the Commission's
intention, the statutory language does not preclude the enforcement
of such promises. Whether the present court will utilize this loophole
is still not known.
C. The Defenses of Nonconsent
When section 33(2) was recommended, the Commission did not
seem to recognize the necessity for the nonconsent defenses. The Coma stated minimum ... ." 232 N.Y. at 114, 133 N.E. aE 370. In the instant case, the privilege
of increasing the price was coupled with the obligation to deliver two printing presses.
Furthermore, there was more than an option; there was a binding agreement with a price
term that might change, subject to a definite standard. This is to be distinguished from
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper Co., 235 N.Y. 30, 138 N.E. 495, 496 (1923),
where there was a price "for the balance of the year to be fixed by mutual consent." There
the plaintiff was within his rights for refusing to be bound, as this was only an "agreement
to agree." Id. at 36, 138 N.E. at 497. In the instant case there was a pre-established criterion
to determine the price.
67 Unless the first contract was required to have a bargained-for exchange.
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mission claimed that the consent rule in Schwartzreich greatly diminished certainty of contract, as "the contractual rights of the parties
[could] only be described by a prediction of what a jury will do." 68
While it is true that the Commission's formal enforcement device increased certainty of contract in comparison with the consent rule, it
it also true that it speaks only to professionals. Yet, even with a formal
device the contractual rights of the parties remain somewhat uncertain, for to avoid enforcing nonconsensual agreements the presumption of consent must be rebuttable. Whether the presumption is
rebutted is a jury question. This section demonstrates that the Commission, as well as the court, is now close to recognizing that the
defenses of nonconsent should be available under the statute.
In 1948 the Commission studied the court's treatment of section
33(2). To justify the court of appeals' lack of reference to section 33(2)
in a memorandum decision, 69 the Commission stated: "[I]t seems obvious that an alleged gratuitous modification agreement should not be
enforced in the absence of clear evidence that the creditor intended
70
that the document bearing his signature should modify his rights.
If the Commission's statement is taken at face value, section 33(2)
would lose its formal attire; the Commission seemed to require evidence of the parties' intent in addition to fulfillment of the statutory
requirements before the modification would be enforced. If compliance with the stdtute is not sufficient, the enforcement device would
create no more certainty of contract than does the consent rule. However, if the Commission's statement is read to sanction the defenses
of nonconsent, certainty of contract would be increased, for the presumption of enforceability inherent in the formal enforcement device
would be preserved.
The Commission's suggestion is supported by the statutory text,
which states that certain modifications or discharges "shall not be
68 1936 L.R.C. REPORT 255.
69 Pape v. Rudolph Bros., Inc., 282 N.Y. 692, 26 N.E.2d 817 (1940). In 1935 Rudolph

signed a five year lease with a rent reserved of $3,600 per year for the first two years and
$4,200 per year for the remaining three years. The rent was to be increased in May 1937,
but Rudolph continued to submit its checks for the lesser amount. Each check had a notation on its face: "Endorsement of this check acknowledges payment of the following [together with a notation that the particular check was in payment of the rent due for a
stated month]. If incorrect please return." Id. at 693 (brackets in original).
The lessor died in March 1937, and so the checks were endorsed and signed by the
landlord's executors. In March 1938, when Rudolph was asked to make up the deficit, it
claimed that the landlord had orally agreed to eliminate the rent increase. The executors
later brought an action to recover the deficit. In the court of appeals, no mention was
made of section 33(2). 1948 L.R.C. REPORT 650.
70 1948 L.R.C. REPORT 653 (emphasis added).
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invalid because of the absence of consideration"; whether such agreements are unenforceable for reasons other than the absence of consideration is a question left open to the court. While the court of
appeals has not discussed this question, the second circuit dealt with
it in United States Navigation Co. v. Black Diamond Lines Inc.7 1 Black
Diamond Lines orally agreed to let two steamers to U.S. Navigation
Company for a minimum of two months, giving U.S. an option to renew
for an additional three months. Black Diamond Lines later drew up
written charter-parties which eliminated the option to renew. U.S.
signed the agreement but included a formal protest and reservation
of rights. 7 2 After Black Diamond executed the written agreement, U.S.
brought suit for breach of the oral agreement.
While the majority opinion does not rely on economic coercion in
its interpretation of section 33(2), its unusual construction of the
73
statute reflects its belief that economic coercion existed:
Unless there was a rescission or an agreement to rescind implicit in the signed charters, which we have already held was
not the case, the New York statute would not invalidate the
oral charters. The statute at most validates the written contracts but they were not received in substitution for the oral
one and effected at most a pro tanto rescission of the latter.7 4
Thus, the court invoked the Schwartzreich approach to avoid a seemingly inequitable result.
The court would have been wiser to construe section 33(2) to allow
the defenses of nonconsent, as the Cochran court did with the seal.
A rule for informal modifications is appropriately coupled with section 33(2) when the court is trying to save a formal modification that
failed for lack of sufficient formality, 75 but this modification failed for
lack of consent. Proof of nonconsent should lead directly to a refusal
124 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1942).
"In view of your January 15th letter and your other statements that you will not let
us have the use of these vessels when their current charters expire unless we sign the
charter parties in the form demanded by you-which do not correctly state the periods and
trading limits which we agreed upon-we return them herewith duly signed by us, under
protest, and reserve our rights in the premises." Id. at 510.
73 "Concededly there was opportunity under the original oral charters for two round
vo)ages, only one of which libellant was granted under the terms of the written charterparties [sic] that were imposed upon the latter against its will. . . . [I]t seems probable
. . . that the new charters [Black Diamond Lines] forced upon the libellant were only
signed by the latter because no other course was open if it was to have any use of the
vessels, and it was under a duty to mitigate damages." Id. at 509.
74 Id. at 511.
75 See subsection D infra.
71

72
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to enforce a formal modification. Perhaps this is the price paid by the
Schwartzreich court for its subtlety.
Judge Learned Hand's view of the fact situation, as stated in dissent,
was substantially the same as the majority's:
The situation is the not uncommon one in which a party to
76
a contract actually, but unwillingly, consents ....
It was in the interpretation of section 33(2) that Judge Hand disagreed
with his brothers, for he believed the statute had to be interpreted to
sanction injustice:
[S]o far as I can now see, the statute should be held to cover
charter-parties. For that reason, I think that the district court
was right, though it is a rather curious irony that a statute,
designed generally to avoid injustice, should in this instance
77
operate so harshly.
While it is not surprising that Judge Hand disagreed with the majority's rather liberal interpretation of the statute, it is surprising that
he did not perceive that the statute allowed a defense of economic
coercion.
From the preceding analysis it can be seen that the Commission
and the judiciary have implicitly recognized that the nonconsent defenses should be allowed under section 33(2). With the appropriate
case, the court of appeals should explicitly recognize this; whatever
justification there may have been for the Schwartzreich court's subtleties has been eliminated. This conclusion is supported by the Cochran
court's earlier explicit recognition of these defenses.
The Commission has now come almost full circle. The statute that
was adopted to eliminate the uncertainty created by the Schwartzreich
rule cannot itself escape some amount of uncertainty.
D. The Continued Viability of The Consent Rule
The Commission's criticism of the Schwartzreich rule suggests a
lack of understanding. 78 Whether a formal or an informal device is
used the contractual rights of the parties should always, in part, be
subject to a later determination. 79 In addition, the increased certainty created by a formal device can only be achieved by knowledgeable professionals. The consent rule in Schwartzreich provides an
informal enforcement device for the amateur. The statutory language
76 124 F.2d at 511 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 512.

78 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
79 See subsection C supra.
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does not preclude the enforcement of modifications that failed to fulfill the formal requirements of the statute. 80 Yet, it would not have
been shocking for the Commission to have eliminated the consent
rule.8 ' This section examines cases in which the court used the consent
rule to enforce modifications that did not fulfill the formal requirements of section 33(2); these cases substantiate the proposition that the
consent rule offers a meaningful approach to an area heavily populated
with amateurs.
In Thompson v. Trinity Operating Co.82 a contract to repair a
building was orally changed by the parties. 83 Trinity, the owner of
80 "[Ilt might be unfortunate if this curative legislation were to be so interpreted as to
restrain a court otherwise willing to make bold with some offer not satisfying the statutory
conditions. The statute was not designed to inhibit evolution of the law of contracts in
more liberal directions, e.g., along the lines of the doctrine of promissory estoppel." Note,
The New York Statute on Irrevocable Offers, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 487, 497 (1943).
81 The law of negotiable instruments is a clear example of a field laced with rigid
formalism: "Nevertheless, the cherished belief in the sacrosanct nature of formal requisites
serves, as do most legal principles, a useful function. The problem is what types of paper
shall be declared negotiable so that purchasers may put on the nearly invincible armor of
the holder in due course. The policy in favor of protecting the good faith purchaser does
not run beyond the frontiers of commercial usage. Beyond those confines every reason of
policy dictates the opposite approach. The formal requisites are the professional rules with
which professionals are or ought to be familiar. As to instruments which are amateur
productions outside any concept of the ordinary course of business, or new types which
are just coming into professional use, it is wiser to err by being unduly restrictive than by
being over liberal. The formal requisites serve as a useful exclusionary device and as a
brake on a too rapid acceptance of emerging trends." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine
of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1069 (1954).
The law of contracts is to be distinguished, for freedom of expression-in terms of form
and substance-is at least as important as certainty of contract. When the primary goal is
to enforce private agreements, flexibility of form is necessary to increase the likelihood that
the parties' intent will be enforced. Furthermore, a signed writing is not adaptable to all
business transactions. Finally, the parties making these agreements are, by no means, all
knowledgeable professionals. To employ formal rules to regulate conduct in a field riddled
with amateurs is not appropriate. This conclusion is implicitly supported by UNrFoRM
COMMERCIUL CODE 2-209(1), which eliminates all formalities for a modified contract of sale.
This conclusion is explicitly supported by the suggestion that: "If both situations are
to be provided for, the attempt should not be made to do so with a single device. The
formal device cannot be made applicable to the informal situation where the promisor is
without knowledge. An attempt to do so must destroy its formality." Lloyd, supra note 33,
at 36.
82 307 N.Y. 639, 120 N.E.2d 854 (1954).
83 On July 27, 1948, after extended negotiations, Thompson wrote to the Trinity
Operating Co. offering to repair a building owned by Trinity for 16,300 dollars. In addition, Thompson stated that, for three years after completing the repairs, he would replace
any defective section of the concrete building, whether it had been repaired by him or not.
Trinity accepted this offer and issued a work order on August 2, 1948. After Thompson
started the construction job, he learned that some previously undiscovered loose and
defective concrete had to be removed. As a result, Thompson asked Trinity for a new
contract. On August 31, a conference was held in which the parties agreed that the work

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 35:173

the building, argued that the contractor was still liable on the guarantee,
because the oral change was not enforceable under section 33(2).84
Even though the terms of the oral change were later reduced to
writing, it is clear from the facts that the modification was not enforceable under the statute, for the writing had not been signed by
both parties. Since the court nevertheless held that the contractor
could recover on the modified contract, an informal means of enforcement must have been allowed.
Under the Schwartzreich rule the question of consent would have
been determined by the jury.8 5 Of the three jury charges86 only one
supported the contractor's case, and it endorsed the Schwartzreich rule.
The court of appeals' acceptance of the jury verdict was thus an implied reaffirmation of the Schwartzreich rule.
The earlier discussion of Feyh v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.87 concluded
8s
that enforcement of the modification was not based on the statute.
How was the modification enforced? The court may have adopted the
appellate division's analysis:
[T]he alleged modification, even if induced by duress, was not
necessarily void, but merely voidable, and a party seeking to
avoid such a contract must act promptly to repudiate it....
Respondent's long delay . . . constituted a waiver of the
89
claim of duress and an aflirmance of the contract.

was to be done under under a new contract with a cost plus system of compensation.
Directly afterwards, Thompson wrote a letter to Trinity confirming the terms of the
new contract and stating that the old contract had been cancelled. Thompson then proceeded with the construction work. On September 21, Trinity replied that it was prepared
to treat the original contract as "modified" with regard to its price terms and to consider
the three year guarantee included in the modification. Thompson stopped work on
October 13, 1948, when Trinity notified him that he would be responsible for performance
under the original contract. Thompson then brought this action on the second contract
to recover payment for the repairs made on Trinity's building.
84 307 N.Y. at 641.
85 "Whether the evidence shows an intention by both parties to rescind the old contract
will in most cases be a question for the jury." 1936 L.R.C. REPORT 255.
86 The trial judge charged the jury that there were three ways to view this situation:
1) The old contract was rescinded and a new one established that eliminated the three
year guarantee, i.e., the Schwartzreich rule. 2) The first contract was modified to change
only the price, and included the three year guarantee in the modification. 3) The parties
did not agree to change the first contract; thus, no new contract was established and the
guarantee continued. 307 N.Y. 641
87 3 N.Y.2d 971, 146 N.E.2d 794, 169 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1957). See text accompanying notes
62-68 supra.
88 See subsection III (B)(2) supra.
89 1 App. Div. 2d 1014, 1015, 151 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (1956) (emphasis added).
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The emphasized statement suggests that the appellate division was
thinking in terms of promissory estoppel theory.90 Even assuming that
Feyh did not assent to the terms of the modification 9 ' when the presses
were delivered, Brandtjen did substantially rely upon Feyh's promise
to pay92 and allowed Feyh to keep the presses. Feyh should have reasonably expected to induce this reliance by signing the notes and
chattel mortgage. 93 Feyh's six month delay in bringing the action
probably cast doubt on the validity of his duress claim.
These explanations of two court of appeals memoranda opinions
support the conclusion that the consent rule in Schwartzreich is being
used by the court to uphold modifications that fail to comply with
the formal prerequisites of section 33(2)9 4 This result can be justified
by an analysis of the statutory language. The statute states that certain
agreements "shall not be invalid because of the absence of consideration" when included in a signed writing. The statute makes no attempt
to preclude the enforcement of informal agreements, either under the
consideration theory of Schwartzreich or promissory estoppel theory;
the choice of enforcing these informal agreements is open to the
judiciary. The court of appeals has chosen to continue the enforcement of informal modifications, perhaps in recognition of the large
number of amateurs attempting to modify a pre-existing contract. The
statute then remains as a permissive device for the enforcement of
formal modifications created by knowledgeable parties. This conclusion gains further support by the very existence of section 33-c of the
Personal Property Laws. 9 5 This statute gives private parties the power
to preclude later oral modifications of their contract. Where a preclusionary clause has not been adopted, the court is free to enforce
later informal oral agreements.
9O See REsrATEMENT OF CONT Acrs

§ 90 (1932).

91 For support of this assumption see subsection III (B)(2) supra.
92 While the judge at special term claimed that the "defendant was not misled by the
plaintiff's inactivity, nor did it change its position in reliance upon it," 207 Misc. 171, 176,
138 N.Y.S.2d 568, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1954), his opinion was overruled by the court of appeals.
93 While injustice could have been avoided by giving a cause of action to Brandtjen
for Feyh's use of the presses, the complicated question of incidental damages probably
dissuaded the court from that solution. See Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (Pts. 1-2), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1937).
94 A third memorandum opinion, Truman v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 1071, 184
N.E.2d 192, 230 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1962), may also support this conclusion. However, the fact
situation is not stated by the majority opinion in the lower court; the only facts reported
are in Judge Steuer's dissent, 14 App. Div. 2d 514, 515, 217 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (1961), and
they are somewhat ambiguous.
95 For a full discussion see section IV infra.
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THE PRIVATE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

With the elimination of the seal as an effective enforcement device, 6 the protective rule that a sealed instrument could not be modified unless it was in writing was destroyed. 97 Realizing that such a
preclusive rule was still needed, the Commission recommended section
33-c of the Personal Property Laws, which allowed private parties to
prohibit oral modification of a contract.98 Through the statute the
Commission sought to prevent false modifications, 99 to increase certainty of contract, 10 and to communicate to the adopting parties the
effects of the preclusion.' 0 '
In 1952 the court of appeals suggested in Green v. Doniger'0 2 that
the statute did not clearly "bring to the attention of the parties the
effect of their acts."' 0 3 Green's oral employment contract with Doniger
was reduced to a writing, which eliminated Green's bonus provisions.
The written contract stated that "it may be terminated by either of
us at any time upon thirty (30) days written notice to the other; and
it shall not be considered modified, altered, changed or amended in
any respect unless in writing and signed by both of us."'014 Green later
notified Doniger that he intended to terminate the contract; Doniger
replied that it would be "unnecessary for him [Green] to terminate
the written contract pursuant to said clause."' 05 They then agreed to
abandon the written contract and reinstate the earlier oral contract.
Green brought the present action under the modified contract.
- The court had to decide whether section 33-c prohibited enforcement of the oral modification. It said that the second clause-"shall
not be considered modified, altered, changed or amended in any re96 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the presence or absence of a seal
upon a written instrument hereafter executed shall be without legal effect." 1941 L.R.C.
REPoRT 361.
97 Id. at 358.

98 "An executory agreement hereafter made shall be ineffective to change or modify, or
to discharge in whole or in part, a written agreement or other written instrument hereafter
executed which contains a provision to the effect it cannot be changed orally, unless such
executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement of
the change, modification or discharge is sought." Id. at 361-62. Adopted as N.Y. LAWS ch.
329 (1941), now, as amended, N.Y. GEN. OBLuATIONs LAw § 15-301.
99 The Commission sought to permit "a party to a written agreement to protect himself
against the danger of false claims of an oral modification." 1941 L.R.C. RFPORT 359.
100 It sought to "definitely fix the character of the instrument as of the time of its
execution." 1952 L.R.C. REPORT 41.
101 It sought to "bring to the attention of the parties the effect of their acts." Id.
102 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949).
103 1952 L.R.C. REPORT 41.

104 Id. at 242, 90 N.E.2d at 58.
'05 Id.
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spect unless in writing and signed by both of us"10°-'appears on
first reading to be such as to invite the protection afforded by subdivision 1 of Section 33-c.' 107 But since the application of section 33-c
depended upon the parties' intent, 108 the court felt free to conclude
that the termination clause established a "less formal procedure for
discharge or termination,"' 1 9 which took precedence over the statutory
preclusion.
The written contract required thirty days written notice for unilateral
termination. Green did not comply with this, perhaps because of
Doniger's statement that it could be ignored. The court said this
termination was bilateral and thus outside the requirements for unilateral termination. The termination and simultaneous creation of a
new contract was then enforced under a consent rule." 0 Was this
result justified? Certainly Green did not appear as an overly attractive
plaintiff."' The sole dissenter claimed that this decision frustrated the
purpose of section 33-c;" 2 thus, the court realized that its distinction
between modification and rescission followed by a new contract
placed the effectiveness of section 33-c in question.
This case could be read broadly to suggest that when the section
33-c clause conflicts with other contract provisions the court will presume that the parties intended to allow oral modification. This interpretation of the statute is based on broad policy considerations, for it is
quite unlikely that Green and Doniger had the sophisticated intent of
allowing rescission followed by a new contract, while prohibiting
modification. This does not imply that the court disliked the statute's
preclusive effects, but that it would grant this power only when the
106 Id.
107 Id. at 244, 90 N.E.2d at 59.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 245, 90 N.E. at 59.

110 "Whether there was actually a waiver of the notice and a mutual consent to the
abandonment involves questions of fact which should be tried before a jury." Id. Once
again the court has distinguished a modification from a simultaneous rescission plus new
contract, based on form not substance. This was recognized by the appellate division:
"there was no abandonment of the written contracts in the sense that the engagement or
enterprise was called off or abandoned, but in substance there was simply a change in the
terms of an uninterrupted and continuing employment." 274 App. Div. 476, 479, 84
N.Y.S2d 587, 590 (1948).
111 "The kind of oral arrangement which plaintiff alleges he made with defendant for
successive years, setting aside written agreements just made and substituting oral agreements requiring nothing different or more from plaintiff but granting him increased compensation, makes his case suspect." Id.
112 "The legislative purpose and design in enacting subdivision 1 of section 33-c of the
Personal Property Law are frustrated, I very much fear, if we sustain the position taken
by the plaintiff-appellant." 300 N.Y. at 246, 90 N.E.2d at 60.
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intent to adopt was clearly stated in the first contract. The case can
also be read as warning that the statute's language was vague; as
a result, adopting parties did not understand its implications. To correct this problem the statutory text would require several separate
sections, each with a narrow and clearly defined thrust. Whatever the
court's reason for this decision, the Commission was not slow to react.
In 1952 the Commission published a study of Green v. Doniger.
They recognized that the statute led to confusion "when the agreement containing the stipulation described in the statute also contains
1 3
other provisions purporting to govern discharge of the agreement."
The Commission recommended that section 33-c be amended to create
a panoply of prohibitions that contracting parties could adopt according to their specific purposes.
Prior to the amendment, section 33-c operated nonselectively to
exclude oral change, modification and discharge. The amendment
gave contracting parties the choice of prohibiting oral change, 14 or
oral termination, 115 or both. The Commission distinguished "change"
from "termination"; change did not become termination "unless all
executory obligations under the agreement or instrument [were] discharged or terminated.""16 In addition, a termination did not become
a change "even though accrued obligations remaining unperformed at
113 1952 L.R.C. REPORT 141. "Even where the contract contains no such independent
provisions, it is possible that the stipulation against oral change may not have been understood by both parties as precluding total discharge or termination by methods recognized
at common law. That is, a distinction may be made by the contracting parties between
change or partial discharge and termination or total discharge, and they may wish to
guard against oral claims with respect to one or the other, or with respect to both. If to
avoid the situation that arose in Green v. Doniger, a bar to termination or total discharge
by any means not involving clear evidence of assent of both parties may be needed." 1952
L.R.C. R.PORT 143.
114 " A written agreement or other written instrument which contains a provision to the
effect that it cannot be changed orally, cannot be changed by an executory agreement
unless such an executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom
enforcement of the change is sought or by his agent." N.Y. LAws ch. 831, § 2 (1952), now
N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 15-301.
115 "A written agreement or other written instrument which contains a provision to the
effect that it cannot be terminated orally, cannot be discharged by an executory agreement
unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement of the discharge is sought, or by his agent, and cannot be terminated by mutual
consent unless such termination is effected by an executed accord and satisfaction other
than the substitution of one executory contract for another, or is evidenced by a writing
signed by the party against whom it is sought to enforce the termination, or his agent." Id.
116 (a) "A discharge or partial discharge of obligations under a written agreement or
other written instrument is a change of the agreement or instrument for the purpose of
subdivision one of this section and is not a discharge or termination for the purpose of
subdivision two, unless all executory obligations under the agreement or instrument are
discharged or terminated." Id.
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' 17
the date of the discharge or termination [were] not affected by it."

In these definitions, the drawing of a definite line was more significant
than its placement; the line gave the parties notice of future effects at
the time the instrument was drafted.
In addition to clarifying the implications of section 33-c for the
adopting parties, the Commission also probably desired to clarify a
few points for the court of appeals. First, to eliminate the possibility
that the court of appeals might once again use the Schwartzreich
rhetoric to skirt this formality, the Commission provided that the
agreement "cannot be terminated by mutual consent unless such
termination is effected by an executed accord and satisfaction other
than the substitution of one executory contract for another .... ,,18
Here, the Commission demonstrated a desire to reduce controversy
by eliminating the requirement of a signed writing for an accord and
satisfaction, while making certain that this did not become a loophole
for enforcing executory oral modifications simply through an allegation of accord and satisfaction. Second, the Commission established a
rule for a contract that had conflicting clauses. When a contract prohibits oral discharge and allows discharge by simple notice, the requirement of a signed writing is imported for the notice provision.1 19
Finally, the Commission prohibited "waiver" of a written notice
requirement unless such "waiver" was also included in a signed
20
writing.
The Commission probably hoped that these changes in the statute
would accomplish one of its basic goals, the increase of contractual
certainty.' 21 This aim can be supported in theory. These formalities
are made available to create certainty of contract and to protect against
false claims of modification. It must be assumed that the parties were
familiar with the course of business in their respective areas; the
possibility of having to modify orally should have been estimated and
117 (b) "A discharge or termination of all executory obligations under a written agreement or other written instrument is a discharge or termination for the purpose of subdivision two even though accrued obligations remaining unperformed at the date of the
discharge or termination are not affected by it." Id.
118 See note 115 supra.

119 (c) "If a written agreement or other written instrument containing a provision that
it cannot be terminated orally also provides for termination or discharge on notice by one
or either party, both subdivision two and subdivision four of this section apply whether or
not the agreement or other instrument states specifically that the notice must be in

writing." Id.
120 "If a written agreement or other written instrument contains a provision for
termination or discharge on written notice by one or either party, the requirement that
such notice be in writing cannot be waived except by a writing signed by the party
against whom enforcement of the waiver is sought or by his agent." Id.
121

1952 L.R.C. REoRT 41.
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compared with the desirability of having the statutory protection. If
there is a bargained-for exchange in the original contract, these questions are presumed to have been discussed at the bargaining table.
Thus, there is a strong case for recognizing no oral modifications, for
with each exception the certainty provided by the statute diminishes.
The position that the Commission presumed the court of appeals
took-preferring freedom of contract to certainty of contract--can
also be supported in theory. The problem could be viewed as analytically similar to allowing a modification when section 33-c has not been
adopted. Whenever a modified contract is enforced, some earlier overt
manifestation of the parties' intent is changed. In the present case,
however, two earlier statements of intent are changed if oral modification is allowed: one provision is procedural or formal-that later
changes be in writing and signed-while the other is substantivethat which relates to some element of the parties' business agreement. In
neither instance were the parties able to predict the path of future
events. Why then prevent the light of future experience from being
shed upon their contractual relations? Whether the court, in fact, disagreed with the Commission-preferring freedom of contract to certainty of contract-cannot be determined now; the new version of
22
section 33-c has not been interpreted by the court
However, there is one exception to the statute that both court and
Commission should acknowledge, that is, where an oral promise was
made with a fraudulent intent and the promise was relied upon by the
promisee. A statute that was enacted to allow "a party to a written
agreement to protect himself against the danger of false claims of an
oral modification"' 123 should not be construed to sanction fraud. If
the exception is broadened to include cases where there was a fraudulent promise without reliance, the exception would be more a punishment to the promisor than compensation to the promisee. By keeping
the exception narrow, the purposes of the statute are more likely to be
fulfilled.
In Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co.124 the court of appeals
was asked to make such an exception to the old version of section 33-c.
Bakhshandeh's contract with American Cyanamid Company provided
for termination by either party upon ninety days notice and prohibited
122 The N.Y. Supreme Court, Special Term, did suggest an interesting interpretation of
83-c(4), the waiver prohibition. It claimed that the party who inserts a clause for his
benefit is free to waive it, irrespective of the statutory prohibition. Arrow Plumbing Co.
v. Dare Construction Corp., 212 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
123 1941 L.R.C. REPORT 359.

124 8 N.Y.2d 981, 169 N.E.2d 188, 204 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1960).
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oral modification. In May, 1951 American Cyanamid Company mailed
notice of termination to Bakhshandeh. Bakhshandeh brought an action
to recover damages for breach of a modification that eliminated
termination until March, 1952. In the supreme court at special term,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel was suggested, for Bakhshandeh
continued to spend time and resources in Iran 25 as a result of American Cyanamid's negotiations with him and oral promise not to terminate the employment contract. In addition, the supreme court hinted
12 6
that American Cyanamid made the promise with a fraudulent intent.
To justify excepting a fraudulent oral modification from section 33-c
the court said:
If this plaintiff can establish his averments to the satisfaction of
a trial court he will bring himself within an ancient doctrine of
equity according to which and despite the Statute of Frauds or
any other exclusionary rule "an oral collateral promise" may
27
be so tainted with fraud that the promisor is held.
This exception can be justified by construing the term "executory
agreement" in section 33-c to exclude oral promises that have been
relied upon in a definite and substantial way.
In the appellate division, Bakhshandeh broadened his argument by
claiming that part performance of the new agreement should render
section 33-c inapplicable; if he had restricted the exception to part
performance induced by fraud, his case would have been stronger.
The court replied that part performance must be "unequivocably referable" to the modified contract, 128 but this does not look to the intent
of the promisor. This requirement can be fulfilled only when the
modification has so many terms differing from the original that performance under the modification could not be confused with performance under the original. This solution diminishes the problems of
proof in searching for fraud under the special term's suggestion, while
125

12 Misc. 2d 742, 743, 177 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (Sup. Ct. 1958).

"The possibility of the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not to
be disregarded in relation to the claimed oral agreement .... It is to be noted in addition
that during the time as claimed when defendant was engaged with plaintiff in continuing
negotiations and discussions, prior to the time when as claimed the oral agreement was
made, the defendant was then negotiating with the person who displaced the plaintiff as
its successor." Id. at 744, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77.
127 Id. at 744, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 377 (citations omitted).
128 "That part performance, in order to avoid the statute, must be 'unequivocably referable' to the oral agreement sought to be enforced. That element is here absent because
what plaintiff claims to have done under the oral agreement could very well have been
done in his own self-interest in the performance of the original contract." 8 App. Div.
2d 35, 38, 185 N.YS.2d 635, 638 (1959) (citations omitted).
126
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it extends statutory protection to those promisors who fortuitously
did not drastically change the original contract. The court of appeals
affirmed the appellate division's decision for American Cyanamid Company.
Whether Bakhshandeh simply had a weak case on the facts or
whether the court disliked the promissory estoppel exception cannot
be determined from this case. However, this exception has been
employed by the supreme court, special term, in its interpretation
of the amended version of section 33-c. In Meadow Brook National
Bank v. Feraca,1 29 an action was brought against the defendants,
guarantors of loans of two corporations. The defendants claimed that
the plaintiff was estopped from claiming liability for its loans, as the
plaintiff had told the defendants that an oral termination was valid.130
Though the original contract adopted section 33-d(4), the court held
that the prohibition of an oral waiver did not include an estoppel:' 3'
Waiver and estoppel represent distinct concepts of law ...
Such an estoppel would not be in conflict with section 33-c
of Personal Property Law, since it would not constitute an oral
modification of a written contract, but the application of an
ancient equitable principle whereby a person whose conduct
had induced reliance thereon may not thereafter bring an ac132
tion which is inconsistent with that conduct.
The court then denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The Commission never defined section 33-c(4)'s prohibition against
oral waiver. Given its desire to create certainty of contract, it may
have hoped to preclude use of promissory estoppel as an escape
from the statute. 33 By suggesting that there is a clear distinction be129 33 Misc. 2d 616, 224 N Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
130 The defendant's attorney attempted to create a very narrow exception to the statute

-allowing an oral termination of liability where the promisor explicitly stated that § 33-c
would not apply. This is to be distinguished from the broader exception of enforcing oral
termination where the promisor had a fraudulent intent but there was no explicit representation regarding the application of section 33-c.
131 The motion to treat the denials as sham was struck down on the ground that the
complaint did not allege the instrument could be terminated orally and therefore section
33-c was not applicable. The motion for summary judgment allowed the court to consider
the affidavits and proofs, which led into the above discussion.
132 Id. at 619, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
133 This conclusion is strongly supported if the draftsmen of section 33-c(4) were familiar with J. EWART, WAIVER DLsmsaurr 38 (1917): "Waiver, then, does not necessarily involve intention, and does not depend 'upon what one himself intends to do.' Closer examination would convince the writer that he is dealing with contract, election, and release
on the one hand, and estoppel on the other, and that he could find no case of 'waiver'
which cannot be placed under one or other of these heads."

1967]

Contract Modifications

tween waiver and estoppel, the court concluded that section 83-c(4) did
not eliminate the estoppel exception. An examination of the precedents cited by the court leads to the conclusion that while there is
no clear distnction between waiver and estoppel,1 4 the statute should
not be construed to eliminate the estoppel exception; higher equitable
principles must prevail. 13 5 Whether proof of the promisor's fraudulent
intent is sufficient or, as in the instant case, proof of a specific representation by the promisor that the oral change or termination will not
be effected by the contractual prohibition, 36 can only be determined
by later cases. As the Meadow Brook case was not appealed, the court
of appeals was not called upon to express its opinion. Yet, given the
court's treatment of the enforcement devices, it seems unlikely that
the court would now place certainty of contract above strong, equitable
considerations, especially when this would defeat a stated purpose of
37
the statute.1
SUMMARY

The world of contract modifications, as seen through the eyes of the
Law Revision Commission, was unnecessarily vague. While the Commission was correct in suggesting that the Schwartzreich rule for informal modifications created uncertainty for contracting parties, it
failed to recognize the reason for this result. The presumption of consent inherent in a formal enforcement device creates certainty of contract, but this presumption is only valid for the professional. Thus, to
insure that only consensual agreements are enforced and that the amateur has some means of obtaining enforcement, an informal enforcement device must be available. This may explain why the court of
appeals' revival of the seal in Cochranand Frelinghuysensupplemented
the consent rule for informal modifications and did not displace it. But,
even for formal modifications, certainty of contract was not an absolute, for the presumption of enforceability was rebuttable by the
defenses of nonconsent. The court refused to create certainty at the
expense of enforcing nonconsensual agreements.
134 See note 133 supra.
135 In Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 457, 127 N.E. 263, 266 (1920), Cardozo,

J. stated when asked to create an exception to the public Statute of Frauds: "The truth is
that we are facing a principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, one
with roots in the yet larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim
upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong..... The Statute of Frauds was
not intended to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle of justice."
Through similar reasoning an exception could be made to the private Statute of Frauds,

section 33-c.
136 See note 150 supra.
137 See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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From the Commission's criticism of the Schwartzreich rule one could
conclude that the Commission supported the adoption of section 33(2)
with the hope of obtaining absolute certainty of contract. Such a hope,
however, is unrealistic. There would be little justification for creating
an enforcement device with an irrebuttable presumption of consent;
even professionals may be victims of force, fraud, or mistake. As a
result, the nonconsent defenses have been recognized under the statute.
Even reading the Commission's criticism of Schwartzreich narrowly,
it is not well founded. So long as modification attempts by amateurs
exist in significant numbers, the informal rule and the concomitant
uncertainty are justified.
The Commission also viewed the world of contract modifications as
too broad. It believed that the court erred when it revived the seal
and consequently allowed gratuitous agreements to be enforced.
Whether the court still believes that such agreements are needed by the
business world is not known. To date, the court has not allowed the
modified gratuitous promise to be enforced under the statute.
Section 33-c, the fraternal twin of section 33(2), gave private parties
the power to prohibit all modifications not included in a signed writing. Here, too, the Commission made a blind stab at creating certainty
of contract. This statute also speaks to knowledgeable parties. How
does one protect the amateur who signs a contract with the preclusive
clause and then performs under an oral modification? The courts
should at least create an exception where the other party agreed to an
oral modification. A statute that was designed to eliminate fraud
should not become a shield for wily professionals.
The court of appeals' reaction to these statutes should provide a
lesson for the Law Revision Commission. While certainty of contract is
important, it is not the only goal of contract law. Accordingly, a simple
but inadequate solution to a difficult problem must soon become the
138
object of judicial amendment.
138 The effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on these two statutes is beyond the
scope of this comment. For the Commission's analysis see 1956 L.R.C. REPORT 172-73,
175-76.

